Security

What it protects. What remains.

sealctl decides which keys a laptop holds, when and for how long, and shows every use. It cannot stop a program from leaking a key that the program was given. This page describes the phone version (0.7, in development); the current release, 0.5.0, has its own threat model.

What sealctl protects against

Threats, sealctl's answer and what remains
Threatsealctl's answerWhat remains
Agent reads key files (.env, ~/.aws, shell history)sealctl scan moves keys out of files on day one; agent hooks refuse reading the storeNothing on disk to read
Prompt injection asks the agent to print or send a keyReading a secret is refused inside agents; values are masked in outputThe agent can still ask to run a command with a key, and that shows on the phone
Malicious repository or dependency runs during npm testOnly the keys named for that command are injected; the use is loggedThat process can leak those keys
Malware on the laptop during the workdayDeploy and cloud tokens live in memory only, for the session, never in filesMalware can use what is open while the session is open
Laptop stolenNothing in plain text on disk; volumes unmounted unless the session is open; open keys sit behind the screen lock until idle or the hard stopA thief who gets past the screen lock while the session is open
Phone lostThe root is locked behind the phone's own passcode; restore from the keychain backup or the words, then change wordsA thief who also knows the passcode
24 words leakedChange words: machines rewrap in seconds, then sealctl migrate re-encrypts volumes and backupsCopies an attacker already took
Machine lost or compromisedUnpair it; the phone's inventory and usage log list what it had open and which secrets it usedThose secrets must be changed at their providers

Standard parts only

BIP39 for the words, HKDF-SHA256 for every key, HPKE (RFC 9180) to seal requests and replies, ChaCha20-Poly1305 for stored data, Ed25519 for signatures, and the phone's own lock. No custom cryptography. The whole design, with diagrams and links to the protocol, is on Cryptographic design.

What the relay sees

Sealed requests, replies, machine status and lock messages that it cannot open; public keys; machine names, OS and model; push tokens; when each machine last called; an encrypted phone backup; days with use; licence state.

It never sees which key was asked for, which command ran or what the agent did. It never logs what was asked and stores no IP address. The full list, with how long each item is kept, is in the Privacy notice.

The closed part

The relay is closed source. It runs the paid service and holds nothing that opens your data. Its API is public, every reply it carries is signed by your phone, and your data opens without it.

If we disappear

  • sealctl recover <path> with the 24 words opens any secret store, volume or backup with no phone, relay or account.
  • sealctl unseal --all hands every volume, backup, SSH key and secret back under passwords of your own, also from the words alone.
  • Volumes are standard APFS or LUKS; backups are standard restic repositories.
  • How to leave, step by step: Leaving sealctl.

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately through a GitHub security advisory on the affected repository, or by email to security@sealctl.com. Please don't open a public issue.

You get a first answer within three working days. Fixed issues are credited in the release notes unless you prefer otherwise. Machine-readable contacts: security.txt. Policy: SECURITY.md.

What we don't claim

No independent audit yet. No certifications. This section changes when that does.

Releases

Every release has a SHA256SUMS file. Download it next to the files you downloaded and check them:

shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing      # macOS
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing          # Linux

To build from source instead: cargo install --locked --git https://github.com/sealctl/sealctl sealctl. See Install.